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I. INTRODUCTION
In 1999, the Florida Supreme Court disarmed a common law doctrine
called the economic loss rule ("ELR") that threatened to extinguish many
commercial tort causes of action. In Moransais v. Heathman, the Florida
Supreme Court took its stand against the invidiously expanding doctrine.'
Subsequently, Florida courts have issued several opinions commenting on,
expanding, or interpreting Moransais, and consequently have redefined
common law negligence.
Generally, the economic loss rule prohibits plaintiffs from bringing tort
claims to recover damages arising from defendants' breaches of contracts,
unless the tort caused personal injury or damage to property outside the scope
of the contract.' If the ELR is strictly applied, the defendants' liability is
limited to damages contemplated in the contract, even if intentional torts were
committed.' The application of this common law doctrine, which apparently
* Emily M. Usow, Esq., an associate of Rollnick & Linden, P.A. in Coral Gables, Florida, earned
her J.D. from the University of Miami School of Law in 1999. She thanks Professor Patrick Gudridge of
the University of Miami School of Law, and Neil P. Linden, Esq. and Philippe Dev6, Esq. of Rolnick &
Linden, P.A., for their advice in the preparation of this article.
Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1999).
2 See Harold D. Oehler & John W. Campbell, And the Walls Came Tumbling Down: Tort
Remedies Collapse Under the Growing Weight of the Economic Loss Rule, THE ADVOCATE, Sept. 1994,
Vol. 21, No. 1, at 1, 1.
3 See id.
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originated in Florida,4 has caused a lot of confusion in courts throughout the
United States.
The active debate surrounding the ELR prompted commercial plaintiffs
to condemn the rule as "the monster that ate commercial torts,", while'
commercial defendants cheered, "finally, a contract is worth the paper it's
written on!"6 The courts have carved out numerous exceptions to the ELR,
including prohibiting many professionals7 from asserting the economic loss
rule as a defense to negligence and malpractice. Until recently, the question
of whether the ELR should be allowed to preclude commercial tort actions
against professionals was unresolved in most states that recognized the
economic loss rule defense.'
In 1999, the Florida Supreme Court addressed this question in Moransais
v. Heathman.9 The court recognized that the question of whether professionals
should be treated differently than other contractors has been an area of
concern in the ELR controversy. In response, the Moransais court asserted
firmly that providers of professional services, regardless of their profession,
should not be able to assert the economic loss rule as a defense to malpractice
claims.'0
This article considers the Moransais decision and subsequent opinions in
light of the origin of the economic loss rule and the reasoning behind previous
exceptions to the ELR. Additionally, this article examines the ways in which
the common law of negligence has been altered since the inception of the
The economic loss rule originated when "the Florida Supreme Court held that contract
principles, not tort principles, must govern claims for economic loss without an accompanying physical
injury or damage to property outside the contract." See Robert H. Buesing & John E. Johnson, The
Economic Loss Rule: A Trial Lawyer's Guide to Protecting Contract Rights, 66 FLA. B.J. April 1992, at
38 (citing Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899, 902 (Fla. 1987)). But
see Moransais, 744 So. 2d at 979 ("the exact origin of the economic loss rule is subject to some debate").
In 1987, the Florida Supreme Courtaddressed the ELR in three decisions: Florida Power & light
Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987). Aetna life & Cas. Co. v. Therm-O-Disc, Inc.,
511 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 1987), and AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987).
These cases are referred to as the "Florida Power, Aetna Life, and AFM trilogy."
s Paul J. Schwiep, The Economic Loss Rule Outbreak The Monster ThatAte Commercial Torts,
69 FLA. BJ., Nov. 1995, at 34.
6 Buesing & Johnson, supra note 4.
In Florida, a profession is "any vocation requiring at a minimum a four-year college degree
before licensing is possible in Florida." Moransais, 744 So. 2d at 976 (citing Garden v. Frier, 602 So. 2d
1273, 1275 (Fla. 1992).
8 See generallyBlancheM. Manning, Legal Malpractice: Is it Tortor Contract?, 21 LoY. U.CHi.
LJ. 741 (1990); but see Moransais, 744 So. 2d at 983 (holding the economic loss rule should not bar any
professional malpractice action, including actions against attorneys) and Collins v. Reynard, 607 N.E. 2d
1185, 1186 (11. 1992) (holding that legal malpractice may be brought in either tort or contract).
9 Moransais, 744 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1999).
10 See id. at 983.
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economic loss rule. The article also reflects upon previous arguments for the
expansion and suppression of the ELR and comments on the consequences of
the court's decision in Moransais.
II. THE SCOPE AND ORIGIN OF THE ELR
Until recently, the ELR barred recovery of damages in most tort actions
unless the victim had also suffered a personal injury or property damage apart
from a preexisting contract." Under the economic loss rule, a plaintiff who
suffered only monetary injury as a result of another's conduct could not
recover those losses in tort.
12
The economic loss rule originated in the products liability context.'3 The
United States Supreme Court first recognized the ELR in East River
Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.'4 In East River the parties
contracted for the design, manufacture, and installation of turbines for
supertankers; however, the turbines malfunctioned, resulting in damage to the
turbines, but causing no other property damage or personal injury. 5 The
plaintiff filed a products liability action seeking damages for the cost of
repairs and income lost due to the broken turbines.1 6 The Supreme Court set
forth the very narrow holding that a products liability claim could not stand
if a commercial plaintiff alleged injury to only the product itself resulting in
purely economic loss. 7
1 See Amanda K. Esquibel, The Economic Loss Rule and Fiduciary Duty Claims: Nothing
Stricter Than Morals of the Marketplace?, 42 VILL. L REV. 789 (1997); Jeffery A. Winikoff & Maxine
Streeter Bradford, Blue Sky Law: 1993 Survey of Florida Law, 18 NOVA L REV. 45, 94 (1993). See also
Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 5 10 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987); Aetna Life & Cas. Co.
v. Therm-O-Disc, Inc., 511 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 1987); AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So.
2d 180 (Fla. 1987). But see Monroe v. Sarasota County Sch. Bd., 746 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999)
("Despite dicta in Moransais that suggests a cause of action can be alleged without allegations of bodily
injury or property damage, we continue to hold, as a general rule, that bodily injury is an essential element
of a cause of action in negligence.").
12 See Reeder R. Fox & Patrick J. Loftus, Riding the Choppy Waters ofEast River: Economic Lass
Doctrine Ten Years Later, 64 DEF. COUNS. J. 260, 260 (1997).
13 See Esquibel, supra note 11, at 791; Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973. 983 (Fla. 1999)
14 East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc.. 476 U.S. 858 (1986).
is See id. at 859.
16 See id. at 861.
17 See id. at 876. Economic loss is defined as "loss due to repair costs, decreased value, and lost
profits," "consequential damages in the nature of cost of repair or replacement or lost profits," or "damages
resulting from the loss of use of the product." Fox & Loftus, supra note 12, at 263 (citing East River
Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Devaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 870 (1986); Lower Lake Dock Co. v.
Messinger Bearing Corp., 577 A.2d 631, 634 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990); Ellen S. Pryor, The Last Ten Years:
What Your Students Know That You Should Know Too: Tort Developments, 1985-1996, 46 J. LEGAL
EDuc. 609, 610 (1996).
1999]
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The foundation of the ELR is based on the East River Court's conclusion
that contract law, in general, is a superior means of allocating the risks of
disappointed economic expectations." The Court explained that plaintiffs are,
or should be, adequately protected from economic loss through contract
remedies. 9 The East River Court reasoned that the injury suffered if a
product breaks is the essence of a warranty action, through which a
contracting party can seek to recoup the benefit of its bargain.' Since no
person or other property is damaged, the resulting losses (i.e. repair costs,
decreased value, and lost profits) are purely economic.2' The damages are
essentially the failure of the purchaser to receive the benefit of his bargain,
damages that are traditionally the core concern of contract law.'
The East River Court asserted that if a product breaks, "the reasons for
imposing a tort duty are weak and those for leaving the party to its contractual
remedies are strong."'  The rationale for this assertion is that contract law and
the law of warranty are well suited to commercial controversies because the
parties set the terms of their own agreements.' Courts perceive contract law
as a superior means of allocating damages for disappointed economic
expectations because contract law contains many tools that limit the expansive
and unpredictable scope of economic losses.' Contract law protects the
economic expectations of contracting parties that bargain freely in allocating
and limiting liability.26 Alternatively, tort law protects the interests of society
by imposing a duty of reasonable care to prevent property damage or physical
harm to others.27
Specifically, the East River Court suggested that through contract
negotiations, manufacturers may restrict their liability by disclaiming
Is See East River, 476 U.S. at 871-875. See also Pryor, supra note 17, at 610.
19 See Esquibel, supra note 11, at 789.
2D See East River, 476 U.S. at 868.
21 See id. at 869.
2 See id. See also E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH., CoNTRAcrs § 2.8 at 839 (1982).
23 East River, 476 U.S. at 871.
24 See id. at 872-73. Although recognizing that warranty and contract law have some limitations,
the East River Court believed that "the main currents of tort law run in different directions from those of
contract and warranty." I& at 373, n.8. The East River decision was very limited in its application to the
viability of a products liability claim when a product breaks, damaging only itself. The applicability of the
Court's rationale, that parties should be able to contract for increased or limited liability, to professional
malpractice cases will be discussed later in this article.
2 See Pryor, supra note 17, at 610. Contractors may only be held liable for damages that naturally
arise from the breach of contract or arise from special circumstances that the contractors were aware of at
the time of the agreement. Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341,354-55, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
2 See Fox & Loftus, supra note 12, at 261.
2 See Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973,981 (Fla. 1999) (citing Casa Clara Condominium
Ass'n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993)).
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warranties or limiting remedies.2" In exchange, purchasers pay less for the
product.29 At the same time, the damages available in breach of warranty
actions give wronged consumers repair costs and lost profits, and places them
in the position they would have been if the product had not been defective."°
After East River, the ELR quickly spread outside the products liability context
and into other commercial sectors of tort law.3" The Florida Supreme Court
ruled on three cases shortly after East River that were subsequently referred
to as the Florida Power, Aetna Life, and AFM trilogy.32 These cases extended
the ELR to other commercial sectors, setting forth the rule that parties cannot
recover in tort for damages arising solely out of a contractual relationship.33
Specifically, in Florida Power & Light, Co. v. Westinghouse Electric Corp.,3'
and Aetna Life & Casualty Co. v. Therm-O-Disc, Inc.,35 the ELR precluded
negligence and strict liability claims because the parties had contracted for the
manufacture of goods. InAFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph
Co., the economic loss rule barred tort claims against a defendant that failed
to perform advertising services as contracted by the parties.36 The Florida
2 See East River. 476 U.S. at 873. See also U.C.C. §§ 2-316, 2-719.
29 See East River, 476 U.S. at 873.
30 See id. at 873-74. See also LL Fuller & William R. Perdue, The Reliance Interest in Contract
Damages, 46 YALELJ. 52, 60-63 (1936); RICHARDA. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OFLAW § 4.8, at 105
(3d ed. 1986). See also Hawkins v. McGee, 146 A. 641 (N.H. 1929).
31 See Esquibel, supra note 11.
32 See Florida Power & light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 510 So. 2d 899 (Fla. 1987); Aetna
Life & Cas. Co. v. Therm-O-Disc, Inc., 511 So. 2d 992 (Fla. 1987); AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel.
Co., 515 So. 2d 180 (Fla. 1987).
33 See Winikoff & Bradford, supra note 11, at 94.
34 Florida Power & Light Co., 510 So. 2d at 899. The facts of Florida Power are similar to those
presented in East River. The parties contracted for the design, manufacture, and supply of steam
generators. Subsequently, the consumer discovered that the generators were defective and brought an action
based on breach of warranty and negligence against the manufacturer. The Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals certified the question of whether Florida law permits a buyer under a contract for goods to recover
economic losses in tort without a claim for personal injury or property damage to property other than the
allegedly defective goods. Florida Power & Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.. 785 F.2d 952 (11 th Cir.
1986). In 1999, the Florida Supreme Court in Moransais asserted that its "holding in Florida Power &
Light remains sound in its adherence to the fundamental principals of the precedents [the Court] relied upon
in applying the so-called economic loss rule." Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 980 (Fla. 1999).
35 AetnaLife & Cas. Co., 511 So. 2d at 992. Therm-O-Disc manufactured a switch that was
purchased by Energy Conservation Unlimited and then incorporated into heat transfer units. The heat
transfer units were later installed in military base housing. Subsequently, the switches failed to activate,
causing substantial damage. Aetna Life, Energy Conservation Unlimited's insurer, reimbursed the
government for the damages then sued Therm-O-Disc for damages in separate counts of negligence, breach
of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied warranty of fitness
for particular purpose, and strict liability. The Florida Supreme Court's decision primarily addressed
questions of long-arm jurisdiction over Therm-O-Disc.
36 AFM Corp., 515 So. 2d at 180. AFM contracted with Southern Bell for advertising in the yellow
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Power, Aetna Life, and AFM trilogy spawned numerous decisions from
Florida's district courts of appeal, as well as several decisions from federal
courts in the Eleventh Circuit, holding that absent accompanying personal
injury or physical property damage, the ELR bars tort claims if parties are in
a contractual setting, regardless of whether the parties had contracted for
goods or services.3"
During the next ten years, the ELR spread at an alarming rate and was
soon applied to bar claims for conversion,3" civil theft,39 Florida RICO,40
tortious interference,4' breach of fiduciary duty,42 negligence,43  strict
pages. Upon Southern Bell's failure to comply with the agreement, AFM chose to file an action based
solely on a tort theory and specifically announced that it was not basing its tort theory on any agreement
between the parties. See AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 796 F.2d 1467 (11 th Cir. 1986). The
AFM court applied the ELR to bar recovery in tort for purely economic losses arising out of a contract
involving the purchase of services. See also Michael E. Hanzman, Interstate Securities Corporation v.
Hayes Corporation: An Unprecedented and Improper Expansion of Florida's "Economic Loss" and
"Independent Tort" Rules, 66 FLA. B.J. 42 (1992).
37 See Esquibel, supra note 11, at 797.
39 See Alafaya Square Assocs., Ltd. v. Great Western Bank, 706 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998);
In re Crestmark of Pinellas Park, Inc., 218 B.R. 621 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1997).
39 See Gambolati v. Sarkisian, 622 So. 2d 47 (Fla. 4th DCA 1993); Gilman Yacht Sales v. First
Nat'l Bank of Chicago, 600 So. 2d 113 1,(Fla. 4th DCA 1992). But see Burke v. Napieracz, 674 So. 2d 756
(Fla. I st DCA 1996) (holding that the ELR did not bar a civil theft claim where the underlying act did not
arise out of a failure to perform the contract but rather from an affirmative act of theft independent from
the contract). See also Comptech Int'l, Inc. v. Milam Commerce Park, Ltd., 24 Fla. L. Weekly S507, 1999
WL 983857 (Fla. 1999) (holding that the ELR does not bar statutory causes of action).
40 See Ginsberg v. Lennar Florida Holdings, Inc., 645 So. 2d 490 (Fla. 3d DCA 1994); Futch v.
Head, 511 So. 2d 314 (Fla. 1st DCA 1987). But see Comptech, 24 Ha. L Weekly S507 (holding that the
ELR does not bar statutory causes of action).
41 See Eclipse Med., Inc. v. American Hydro-Surgical Instruments, Inc., No. 96-8532-CIV-
RYSKAMP, 1999 WL 181412 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 20, 1999); Crain v. Sunbank/Gulf Coast, Inc., No. 95-1156-
CIV-T-17C, 1996 WL 172984 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 11, 1996).
42 See Interstate Secs. Corp. v. Hayes Corp., 920 F.2d 769 (11 th Cir. 1991); Powell v. Mactown,
Inc., 707 So. 2d 825 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998); Karn v. Coldwell Banker Residential Real Estate, Inc., 705 So.
2d 680 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Alafaya Square Assocs., Ltd, 706 So. 2d 39; Ginsberg, 645 So. 2d 490;
Airlines Reporting Corp., 841 F. Supp 1166; Rosa v. Florida Coast Bank, 484 So. 2d 57 (Fla. 4th DCA
1986); Nautica Int'l, Inc. v. Intermarine USA, LP., 5 F. Supp. 2d 1333 (S.D. Fla. 1998). But see First
Equity Corp. of Florida, Inc. v. Watkins, 24 Fla. L Weekly D1758, 1999 WL 542639 (Fla. 3d DCA 1999)
(holding that the economic loss rule has not abolished the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, even
if there is an underlying oral or written contract); Performance Paint Yacht Refinishing, Inc. v. Haines, No.
99-7157-CIV-FERGUSON, 1999 WL 1285843 (S.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 1999). The Third District Court of
Appeal in First Equity Corp. recognized that the Eleventh Circuit held that the ELR barred a breach of
fiduciary claim in Interstate Securities, but felt that since the decision in Moransais, Florida's position
regarding this issue had been modified.
43 See Ocean Ritz of Daytona Condominium v. GGV Assocs., Ltd., 71O So. 2d 702 (Fla. 5th DCA
1998); Smith v. State ex rel. Florida A&M Univ., 701 So. 2d 348 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997); All Am. Semi
Conductor, Inc. v. Mil-Pro Servs., Inc., 686 So. 2d 760 (Fla. 5th DCA 1997); Muns v. Shurgard Income
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liability," product liability,45 negligent misrepresentation,' and fraud' - all
of which are commercial torts designed to redress primarily economic losses.4
Under the ELR, plaintiffs could not allege an independent tort unless the
damages were beyond the economic losses caused by a breach of contract.49
The economic loss rule was applied to bar "all tort claims for economic losses
without accompanying personal injury or property damage," and often
prohibited legitimate commercial tort claims, in effect, allowing the ELR
defense to be used as a sword rather than as a shield.-'
Perhaps the most recognized and criticized instance of the unrestrained
widening of the ELR is demonstrated in Interstate Securities Corp. v. Hayes
Corp.,5 in which the Eleventh Circuit asked whether a breach of fiduciary
duty is foreclosed between parties to a contract, or whether it constitutes a tort
separate and independent from an accompanying breach of contract, if there
has been no physical injury or property damage. 2 The Interstate Securities
court relied on the fact that no relationship would have existed between the
plaintiff and defendant if they had not entered into a contract.5 3 Therefore, the
court reasoned the defendant's duty of good faith and fiduciary duty came
from the contract rather than from common law. 4
The Interstate Securities court used the ELR to bar tort claims without
regard to the type of case involved or the ramifications of the result reached,
and improperly expanded the ELR and independent tort doctrines beyond their
Properties Fund 16--LP., 682 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 4th DCA 1996); Fishman v. Boldt, 666 So. 2d 273 (Fla. 4th
DCA 1996); Hurtado v. Stewart Title of Miami, Inc., 664 So. 2d 1081 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
4' See Airport Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Prevost Car, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 1203 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
45 See Fishman, 666 So. 2d 273; National Marine Underwriters, Inc. v. Donzi Marine Corp., 655
So. 2d 176 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
46 See Straub Capital Corp. v. L Frank Chopin, P.A., 724 So. 2d 577 (Fla. 4th DCA 1998); Palau
Int'l Traders, Inc. v. Narcam Aircraft, Inc., 653 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995); Florida College of
Osteopathic Med., Inc. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 982 F. Supp. 862 (M.D. Fla. 1997).
47 See Bankers Risk Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. Av-Med Managed Care, Inc., 697 So. 2d 158 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1997); Sarkis v. Pafford Oil Co., Inc., 697 So. 2d 524 (Fla. Ist DCA 1997); Dantzler Lumber &
Export Co. v. Bullington Lumber Co., Inc., 968 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D. Fla. 1997). But see Dantzler Lumber
& Export Co. v. Bullington Lumber Co., 25 Fla. L Weekly D203 (Jan. 19, 2000) revising 968 F. Supp.
1543.
4' See Esquibel, supra note 11.
49 See Oehler & Campbell, supra note 2.
50 Schwiep, supra note 5, at 40 (citing Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino
& Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla. 1993)).
51 Interstate Sees. Corp. v. Hayes Corp., 920 F.2d 769 (11 th Cir. 1991). See also Schwiep, supra
note 5; James G. Dodrill II, Interstate Securities Corp. v. Hayes Corp.: Should the Economic Loss Doctrine
Apply to Actions Against Fiduciaries?, 47 U. MIAMI L REv. 1193 (1991).
32 See Interstate Secs., 920 F.2d at 769.
3 See id. at 776-77.
54 See id.
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intended scope."5 The Interstate Securities court was misguided in its
assumption that the ELR applied to any type of case in which a plaintiff
involved in a contractual relationship sought economic damages.56
Essentially, Interstate Securities broadly asserted that if the parties'
relationship was premised upon a contract, then any act of fraud, negligence,
breach of fiduciary duty, or other tort, was classified as a breach of contract.
Taking the Interstate Securities decision to its logical extreme, consumers of
professional services would have been barred from bringing malpractice or
breach of fiduciary claims against attorneys, accountants, appraisers, or other
professionals who rendered services pursuant to a contract, no matter how
egregious their conduct.5 7
The economic loss rule was simply not designed to insulate parties from
tort liability merely because the litigants were parties to a contract, the
plaintiff's damages were purely economic, or the damages claimed under
alternative tort and contract theories were the same."8 Critics warn that
indiscriminate application of the ELR, such as that employed in Interstate
Securities, bars clearly appropriate and permissible tort claims. 9 This type of
unfettered expansion of the economic loss rule prompted the Florida Supreme
Court in Moransais v. Heathman to chastise trial and appellate courts for
applying the ELR to situations well beyond the court's original intent.6° The
court stated:
We agree with the observations of those who have noted that because
actions against professionals often involve purely economic loss
without accompanying personal injury or property damage, extending
the economic loss rule to these cases would effectively extinguish
such causes of action... This is not what this Court had in mind many
years ago when it applied the economic loss rule in Florida Power &
Light.6
1
Within weeks of the Moransais decision, Florida's Third District Court
of Appeal issued the first opinion applying Moransais.62 This opinion
55 See Hanzman, supra note 36, at 42.
56 See id. at 43. See also Fi'st Equity Corp. of Florida, Inc. v. Watkins, 24 Fla. L. Weekly D1758,
1999 WL 542639 (Fla. 3d DCA July 28, 1999).
57 See Hanzman, supra note 36, at 43.
59 See id.
59 See id. at 42.
60 See Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 980 (Fla. 1999).
61 Id. at 983 (citing Schwiep, supra note 5, at 40, and Manning, supra note 8, at 742).
62 See First Equity Corp. of Florida, Inc. v. Watkins, 24 Fla. L Weekly D1758,1999 WL542639,
at *50.
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contradicted the Eleventh Circuit Court's Interstate Securities opinion. In
First Equity Corp. of Florida, Inc. v. Watkins, the Third District Court of
Appeal asserted that, in light of Moransais, "the economic loss rule has not
abolished the cause of action for breach of fiduciary duty, even if there is an
underlying oral or written contract."6 3 In a footnote to this opinion, the First
Equity court suggested that the Interstate Securities opinion was based on law
that was "not entirely clear," and, indeed, was erroneous in light of
Moransais.
However, Moransais does not explicitly overrule AFM,65 the decision
upon which Interstate Securities is based. Moransais cites AFM as an example
of a holding that "appeared to expand the application of the [economic loss]
rule beyond its principled origins and contributed to applications of the rule
by trial and appellate courts to situations beyond [the Florida Supreme
Court's] original intent." Therefore it is not clear whether Interstate
Securities has been overruled. The Moransais court's failure to overturn AFM
has caused Florida's Southern District Court to make conflicting decisions
regarding whether the ELR bars claims for breach of fiduciary duty.67
Although Moransais was limited to professional malpractice, the Moransais
court implied that other torts would not be excluded by the economic loss rule,
stating that "[t]he rule, in any case, should not be invoked to bar well-
established causes of action in tort."" The Third District Court interpreted this
to mean that breach of fiduciary duty, as a well-established cause of action in
tort, was not barred by the ELR. Thus, the court extended Moransais to
further curtail the reach of the economic loss rule.' There is no indication that
the Florida Supreme Court will affirm this position, nor is there any indication




63 AFM Corp. v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 515 So. 2d 180 (Fa. 1987).
66 Moransais, 744 So. 2d at 981.
67 See Crowell v. Morgan Stanley Dean Witter, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1287 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (held breach
of fiduciary duty claims are not barred by the economic loss rule) and Medalie v. FSC Secs. Corp., No. 98-
3183-CIV-GOLD, 2000 WL 255918 (S.D. Fla. Feb. 1. 2000) ("Mhe court cannot hold that a claim of
breach of fiduciary duty is not barred by the economic loss rule in light of Moransais.").
68 Moransais, 744 So. 2d at 983.
69 See Fisrst Equity Corp. of Florida, Inc. v. Watkins, 24 Fla. L Weekly D1758, 1999 WL 542639
(Fla. 3d DCA July 28, 1999); Invo Florida, Inc. v. Somerset Venturer, Inc., No. 3D98-3174, 2000 WL
276350 (Fla. 3d DCA March 15, 2000).
70 See Crowell, 87 F. Supp. 2d 1287.
1999]
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The continued vitality of AFM calls into doubt exactly how expansive
a ruling Moransais intended to be. This question appears to be
becoming an issue among the Courts of Appeal in Florida as
evidenced by the broader Third District Court of Appeal decision in
First Equity and the narrower Second District Court of Appeal in
Monroe... [t]he Moransais decision is still too new, not specifically
on point, and apparently subject to conflicting interpretations. 7,
Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court will have to provide clarification of the
Moransais decision and refine the scope of the economic loss rule.
M. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST REDUCING THE SCOPE OF THE ELR
Defendants relied on the ELR to insulate themselves from tort liability in
cases in which the parties were involved in a contractual relationship and the
plaintiff sought damages for purely economic losses.72 This was accomplished
by arguing that if the litigants were parties to a contract and the damages
alleged were purely economic, recovery in tort was barred by the economic
loss rule.73 "Likewise, defendants maintain[ed] that if conduct alleged to be
tortious also constitute[d] the breach of a contract existing between the
parties, or the damages claimed under alternative contract and tort theories
[were] the same, recovery in tort [was] barred as a matter of law due to a
failure to establish a tort distinguishable from or independent of the breach of
contract." '74
Proponents of the ELR believe that the rule, despite its expansive scope,
promoted efficiency and predictability in commercial settings by limiting
71 Medalie, 2000 WL 255918, at *7
7 See Hanzman, supra note 36.
73 See id.
74 Id. The doctrinal test applied to determine whether intentional tort claims shall be barred by the
ELR is an inquiry into the "independent tort"--that is tortious conduct arising independent from a breach
of contract. Plaintiffs must be able to satisfy the elements of an independent tort and distinguish it from
claims arising from a wrongful breach of contract to avoid dismissal of their claim. See Pryor, supra note
17. An example of tortious conduct arising independent from a breach of contract can be found in Leisure
Founders. Inc. v. CUC Int'l, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 1562 (S.D. Fla. 1993), wherein a stock purchaser
fraudulently induced a stock holder to contract for the sale of shares prior to and distinct from a willful
breach of contract. The Leisure Founders court explains a tort independent from a breach of contract by
providing an example of a builder that steals doors installed in a buyer's house. In such circumstances, the
mere fact that a contract existed between the parties for building the house does not permit the builder to
escape liability for stealing the doors. Id. at 1574.
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liability to that contemplated in the contract."s Contracts and warranties have
built-in limitations on liability, whereas tort actions could subject
manufacturers to damages of indefinite amounts. 6 The limitation in a contract
action comes from the parties' agreement and the requirement that
consequential damages be foreseeable results of a breach."
Advocates of the economic loss rule argue that it encourages parties to
contemplate economic risks by refusing to impose tort duties and
corresponding cost burdens on the public.7 In a free market economy, the
ELR encourages people to bargain for private rights and remedies concerning
economic issues."9 Permitting recovery in tort for purely economic losses
could make manufacturers liable for vast sums and cause them to raise the
price of their goods.' Absent some measure of certainty regarding the scope
of a contracting party's exposure, it is impossible to price goods or services
accurately.8" By limiting a breaching party's liability to that agreed to in a
contract, parties can conduct business without the threat of unlimited
liability. 2 However, this argument ignores the fact that manufacturers are
rarely able to price goods accurately. The uncertainty arising from the risk of
litigation is just one element in pricing goods with which manufactures must
contend.
Furthermore, proponents of the ELR believe the rule preserves the
integrity of negotiated contracts. In practice, the economic loss rule precludes
parties from seeking tort remedies if the contractual remedies are unfavorable
and, in effect, inserting new terms attributing greater liability to a breaching
party in previously negotiated agreements.8 3 This argument disregards
traditionally accepted means by which new terms are commonly inserted into
prior agreements. Although parties to a contract have the option of
negotiating certain terms, in the event that those parties fail to do so, many
terms can be implied. Courts, when interpreting ambiguous contractual terms,
often look outside the four corners of a contract to consider parol evidence,
default provisions, and the previous conduct of the parties. Additionally, if
a party to a contract commits an intentional tort, that conduct is outside the
negotiated agreement given the parties' mutual obligations to perform a
contract in good faith. Therefore, regardless of the terms of the agreement, the
75 See Fox & Loftus, supra note 12, at 261.
76 See East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Devaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 874 (1986).
7 See id. See also Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
79 See Hanzman, supra note 36.
79 See Monroe v. Sarasota County Sch. Bd., 746 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
so See East River Steamship, 476 U.S. at 874.
a] See Fox & Loftus, supra note 12, at 261.
82 See Oehler & Campbell, supra note 2.
3 See Buesing & Johnson, supra note 4.
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wronged party should be allowed to recover damages for tortious acts outside
of the contract. Rather than inserting new terms into an existing contract,
these claims redress behavior, such as civil theft or fraud, that was never
contemplated by parties contracting in good faith.
Further, the ELR supporters argue that by facilitating the early dismissal
of tort claims, the economic loss rule pares down lawsuits, decreases court
congestion, and facilitates the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of
legitimate claims." However, hastily eliminating tort claims may not be the
most prudent or effective way to decrease litigation. For example, in some
cases contractual arbitration clauses may accomplish this goal by precluding
contractors from involving the courts when resolving questions of liability.85
In addition, the strictness of the burden of proof applied to establishing tort
claims could determine the length of time for which litigation continues. If
the burden of proof is clear, then many questions of liability could easily be
determined by the court through summary judgment procedures. Otherwise,
liability becomes a murkier question of fact that requires a lengthier jury trial.
Commercial plaintiffs are especially distressed because the economic loss
rule has often been used to bar intentional tort claims, such as fraud. Critics
argue that the ELR trumped the fundamental common law premise that people
that commit intentional torts should be liable in tort alone, and contract claims
should not even be considered in this context.86 Many attorneys and
academics criticize the application of the ELR to intentional tort claims. 7 At
the time that they enter into a contract, plaintiffs simply do not anticipate that
intentional torts, such as fraud, conversion, or civil theft, will be committed
against them. Even if the parties are bargaining at arm's length, there is a
presumption that they all intend to perform the contract in good faith.
Therefore, in many cases of intentional torts, contract remedies may not exist
or, if they do exist, may not provide the victim with complete compensation.88
Furthermore, the ELR may bar tort claims and prohibit a litigant from
seeking punitive damages for intentional wrongs that have been committed
against him, thereby failing to deter future malicious and intentional acts by
the defendant. 9 This could impede or bar the plaintiff's recovery because tort
P See Oehler & Campbell, supra note 2.
83 However, in some cases if there are multiple parties to the contract or there are many parties to
the litigation that may be liable, then the complex nature of the case may preclude arbitration. This is
commonly the case in construction litigation matters involving contractors and subcontractors as well as
a buyer.
96 See Schwiep, supra note 5.
87 See id. at 41-42.
U See Esquibel. supra note 11.
9 See id.
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claims are often subject to longer statutes of limitations than contract claims.'
Moreover, tort claims are subject to fewer obstacles than contract claims
because issues such as parol evidence, the statute of frauds, interpretation of
terms, uncertainty, illegality, or lack of consideration need not be
determined.91
IV. PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE -- CONTRACT OR TORT
"The economic loss rule is stated with ease but applied with great
difficulty."'  "Lawyers and judges alike have found it difficult to determine
when the rule applies and when an exception is appropriate."93 Although the
ELR is easily and sensibly applied in the products liability context, its
application to professional malpractice actions always seemed forced. The
cause of action for professional malpractice originated in contract law.94
However, contract theories failed to provide adequate remedies for bodily
injuries, such as those resulting from medical malpractice.95 Therefore, the
courts looked to the law of negligence and eventually applied negligence
theories to other types of professional malpractice in which damages consisted
primarily or purely of intangible economic losses.9"
Accountants, lawyers, architects, and other professionals providing
primarily intellectual services ordinarily do so on the basis of a contract.97
Generally, in legal malpractice cases, the plaintiff does not suffer personal
injury or property damage; he suffers only intangible economic loss.9" If the
90 Id. Although Florida has adopted a single statute of limitations for contract and tort based
professional malpractice actions, other jurisdictions have not. See Dodrill, supra note 51, at 1213. FLA.
STAT. § 95.1 l(4)(a) (1998) provides:
(4) Within Two Years-
(a) An action for professional malpractice, other than medical malpractice, whether founded
on contract or tort; provided that the period of limitations shall run from the time the cause of
action is discovered or should have been discovered with the exercise of due diligence.
However, the limitation of actions herein for professional malpractice shall be limited to persons
in privity with the professional.
See generally Joseph H. Koffler, Legal Malpractice Statutes of Limitations: A Critical Analysis of a
Burgeoning Crisis, 20 AKRON L REV. 209,229-36 (1986).
91 See Esquibel, supra note 11.
92 Sandarac Ass'n. v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d 1349,1352 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
93 Id. at 1352.
" See Monroe v. Sarasota County Sch. Bd., 746 So. 2d 530, 535 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999).
See id.
96 See id.
97 See Herbert Bernstein. Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss Under American Tort Law, 46
AM. J. CoMP. L II I (1998).
N See William Powers, Jr. & Margaret Niver, Negligence, Breach of Contract, and the "Economic
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client is disappointed with the quality of the service and a financial loss is
arguably attributable to his attorney's misconduct, the client may have a cause
of action for breach of contract and perhaps also for malpractice." Generally,
courts discuss legal malpractice in terms of negligence, but some view it as a
breach of contract, limiting recovery to economic losses."° The courts have
not agreed on whether legal malpractice actions arise in tort from the
attorney's breach of a duty of care, 10 or in contract from the attorney's breach
of the contractual relationship created at the time the parties agreed to the
representation."2 This imprecise classification left legal malpractice claims
vulnerable to attack by the economic loss rule."0 3
As courts continued to accept the superiority of contract law in allocating
the risks of economic losses, they also noted many contexts in which the ELR
did not bar tort recovery. 'I Courts found several "special relationships" and
other exceptions to the economic loss rule that prohibited the ELR defense.
Exceptions were established for intentional misrepresentation and negligent
misrepresentation by a person in the business of supplying information for the
guidance of others in their business transactions."05 Florida's Third District
Court of Appeal even recognized an exception to the ELR for certain
professional services even if the claimant was not in privity with the service
provider."° Professionals barred from asserting the ELR defense include
abstractors,' 07 engineers, 08 appraisers, 1 9 and accountants.1
Loss" Rule, 23 TEX. TECH. L REV. 477 (1992).
See Bernstein, supra note 97, at 114.
""o See Powers & Niver, supra note 98, at 494 (citing Fireman's Fund Am. Ins. Co. v. Patterson &
Liberty, Inc., 528 S.W. 2d 67, 69-70 (Tex. App. 1975), and Atkins v. Crosland, 406 S.W. 2d 263, 264-65
(Tex. App. 1966)). See also Manning, supra note 8, for a more complete discussion of the requirements
to prevail on a tort-based legal malpractice claim in Illinois.
101 See, e.g., RTC v. Boyar, Norton & Blair, 796 F. Supp. 1010 (S.D. Tex. 1992); Marias v.
Marano, 813 P.2d 350 (Idaho 1991); Pelham v. Griesheimer, 440 N.E.2d 96 (I1. 1982).
102 See Dodrill, supra note 51, at 1213. See also Zanders v. Jones, 680 F. Supp. 1236 (N.D. Ill.
1988); McConico v. Romeo, 561 So. 2d 523 (Ala. 1990); Jones v. Wadsworth, 791 P.2d 1013 (Alaska
1990).
103 See Dodrill, supra note 51, at 1213.
104 See Pryor, supra note 17, at 610 (citing Symposium on the Law of Bad Faith in Insurance and
Contract, 72 TEX. L REV. 1203 (1994)).
105 See Cornelia Honchar Tuite, Limit on Malpractice Claims Promises to Change the Practice,
C. DAiLY L BUuLErIN, January 3,1992; Moorman Mfg Co. v. National Tank Co., 435 N.E. 2d 443 (Ill.
1982).
106 See Daniel M. Bachi & Bard D. Rockenback, The Practical Limitations of the Economic Loss
Rule, 69 FLA. B.J. 89, 91 (1995).
107 See Sandarac Ass'n, Inc.v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 2d DCA 1992).
109 See Southland Constr., Inc. v. Richeson Corp., 642 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 5th DCA 1994); Bay Garden
Manor Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. James D. Marks Assocs., Inc., 576 So. 2d 744 (Fla. 3d DCA 1991).
1o See First State Say. Bank v. Albright & Assocs., Inc., 561 So. 2d 1326 (Fla. 5th DCA 1990),
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Many courts that have extended the ELR to bar the recovery of economic
losses resulting from intentional acts where there was a contractual
relationship for service, failed to reconcile the implications of the ELR with
existing doctrines, such as the privity requirement for professional malpractice
claims."' As a result, the expansion of the ELR to claims involving services
led to inconsistent results." 2 For example, some states permit professional
negligence claims if the parties have entered into a contract, 13 whereas other
states only permit such claims in the absence of a contract." 4
The essence of professional malpractice actions in general, and legal
malpractice actions in particular, is the relationship between the parties and
the nature of the services involved." 5 In Resolution Trust Corp. v. Holland
& Knight, the Southern District Court of Florida determined that the ELR
cannot bar a legal malpractice claim even if a related contract claim exists."
6
The court recognized that Florida law was unclear regarding whether
professional malpractice actions were tort or contract claims." 7 Ultimately,
the Resolution Trust court expressed its reluctance to extend the ELR to legal
malpractice actions in light of the rule's origin in contracts for goods."'
In 1999, the Florida Supreme Court reached a similar, though broader,
conclusion in Moransais v. Heathman.' In addressing the applicability of the
ELR defense to malpractice actions against engineers, the court considered
whether the rule should apply to any negligence action involving a
professional services contract. In Moransais, the plaintiff had contracted with
an engineering firm to inspect a home prior to purchase.20 The plaintiff relied
disapproved in part on other grounds, Garden v. Frier, 602 So. 2d 1273, 1277 n.10 (Fla. 1992); Bachi &
Rockenback, supra note 106, at 91.
110 See Fst Florida Bank, N.A. v. Max Mitchell & Co., 558 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1990); Durham v. Palm
Court, Inc., 558 So. 2d 59 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). See also Schwiep, supra note 5, at 40. But see Palau Int'l
Traders, Inc. v. Narcam Aircraft, Inc., 653 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
II See Fox & Loftus, supra note 12, at 266.
112 See id.
113 See id. See also Ward v. Ernst & Young, 435 S.E.2d 628 (Va. 1993); Linde Enter., Inc. v.
Hazelton City Auth., 602 A.2d 897 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992).
14 See Fox & Loftus, supra note 12, at 266. See also John Martin Co. v. Morse/Diesel, Inc., 819
S.W.2d 428 (Tenn. 1991); Guardian Constr. Co. v. Tetra Tech Richardson, Inc., 583 A.2d 1378 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1990); Georgetown Steel Corp. v. Law Eng'g Testing Co., 7 F.3d 223 (4th Cir. 1993).
15 See Manning, supra note 8, at 749.
116 See Resolution Trust Corp. v. Holland & Knight, 832 F. Supp. 1528 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
11 See id. See also Kartikes v. Demos, 214 So. 2d 86, 87 (Fla. 3rd DCA 1968) (held malpractice
is an action in contract); cf. Mayo v. Engel, 733 F.2d 807, 811 (11th Cir. 1984) (held malpractice is an
action in tort).
Hs See Resolution Trust, 832 F. Supp. at 1532 n. 7.
19 Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973 (Fla. 1999).
120 See id. at 974.
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on the engineers' inspection and advice at the time he purchased the home,
only to find that the engineers failed to discover serious structural defects.'
The plaintiff brought an action against the engineers for professional
negligence, not alleging any bodily injury or property damage other than the
undetected defects in the home." 2 The trial court reluctantly granted the
defendants' motion for summary judgment and agreed that the economic loss
rule barred the plaintiff' s claim due to the contractual relationship between the
parties. 3 The Second District Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, but
found that "the continuing uncertainty surrounding the economic loss rule"'"
warranted certification to the Florida Supreme Court.'
Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court determined that the economic loss
rule did not bar a cause of action against any professional for his negligence
even if the resulting damages were purely economic and there was a
contractual relationship between the parties.'2 6 The court noted that the law
imposed on professionals a duty to perform services in accordance with the
standard of care used by similar professionals in the community under similar
circumstances.' 2 7 The court relied on Lochrane Engineering, Inc. v.
Willingham Realgrowth Investment Fund, Inc.,28 in which Florida's Fifth
District Court of Appeal explained the difference between the duties created
in an ordinary contract for goods or services and the duty imposed in a
contract for professional services as follows:
121 See id. at 974-75.
In See id. at 975.
123 See id. (citing Sandarac Ass'n, Inc. v. W.R. Frizzell Architects, Inc., 609 So. 2d 1349 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1992)).
124 Moransais v. Heathman, 702 So. 2d 601,602 (Fla. 2d DCA 1997).
15 The Second District Court of Appeal certified the question:
When the alleged damages are purely economic, can the purchaser of a residence, who contracts
with an engineering corporation for a pre-purchase inspection, maintain a professional
negligence action against the licensed engineer who performed the inspection as an employee
of the engineering corporation?
The Florida Supreme Court rephrased the certification into two questions:
(1) Where a purchaser of a home contracts with and engineering corporation, does the
purchaser have a cause of action for professional malpractice against an employee of the
engineering corporation who performed the engineering service?
(2) Does the economic loss rule bar a claim for professional malpractice against the individual
engineers who performed the inspection of the residence where no personal injury or property
damage resulted?
Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 974 (Fla. 1999).
12 See id. at 983.
127 See id. (citing Lochrane Eng'g, Inc. v. Willingham Realgrowth Inv. Fund, Ltd., 552 So. 2d 228,
232 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989).
in Lochrane Eng'g, Inc. v. Willingham Realgrowth Inv. Fund, Ltd., 552 So. 2d 228, 232 (Fla. 5th
DCA 1989).
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The duty of a professional who renders services, such as a doctor,
lawyer, or engineer is different from the duty of one who renders
manual services or delivers a product. The contractual duty of one
who delivers a product or manual services, is to conform to the
quality or quantity specified in the express contract, if any, or in the
absence of such specification, or when the duty and level of
performance is implied by law, to deliver a product reasonably suited
for the purposes for which the product was intended...or to deliver
services performed in a good and workmanlike manner. However, the
duty imposed by law upon professionals rendering professional
services is to perform such services in accordance with the standard
of care used by similar professionals in the community under similar
circumstances.""
Additionally, the court sought guidance from opinions regulating the
Florida Bar. When the Florida Supreme Court decided to allow lawyers to
form professional associations, the court had reservations because it feared
that lawyers would be able to use the business entity to shield themselves from
personal liability for malpractice.' Although the court approved of the
practice of law in a corporate form, the court also expressly recognized that
a lawyer rendering professional services owes a duty of care regardless of the
lawyer's association with a business entity that limits liability.' 3l  The
Moransais court pointed out that these reservations were reflected in statutory
regulations that codified the intent to hold professionals personally liable for
their negligent acts.'32
129 Moransais, 744 So. 2d at 976 (quoting Lochrane Eng'g, Inc. v. Willingham Realgrowth Inv.
Fund, Ltd., 552 So. 2d 228, 232 (Fla. 5th DCA 1989)).
130 See Moransais, 744 So. 2d at 976 (citing In re The Florida Bar, 133 So. 2d 554, 556 (Fla.
1961)). In In re The Florida Bar, the court recognized the uniqueness of the attorney-client relationship,
reasoning that:
Traditionally, prohibition against the practice of a profession through the corporate entity has
been grounded on the essentially personal relationship existing between the lawyer and his
client, or the doctor and his patient. This necessary personal relationship imposes upon the
lawyer a standard of duty and responsibility which does not apply in the ordinary commercial
relationship. The non-corporate status of the lawyer was deemed necessary in order to preserve
to the client the benefits of a highly confidential relationship, based upon personal confidence,
ability, and integrity. If a means can be devised which preserves to the client and the public
generally, all of the traditional obligations and responsibilities of the lawyer and at the same
time enables the legal profession to obtain a benefit not otherwise available to it, we can find
no objection to the proposal.
131 See Moransais, 744 So. 2d at 978.
1 See id. citing FLA. STAT. § 612.07 (1998) providing that:
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These considerations led the Moransais court to conclude that the
economic loss rule was "never intended to bar well-established common law
causes of action, such as those for neglect in providing professional
services."' 33 The court held that the application of the ELR was limited to
situations in which the policy considerations were substantially similar to
those underlying product liability cases, and "should not be invoked to bar
well-established causes of action in tort, such as professional malpractice."'"
Although the court recognized that provisions of a contract may impact a legal
dispute, including an action for professional services, it held that the mere
existence of such a contract should not bar professional malpractice actions.'35
In addition to the practical problems of limiting plaintiffs to contractual
remedies in legal malpractice actions, the Moransais court considered ethical
problems associated with applying the ELR to professional negligence actions
in general.'36 The court asserted that "it is questionable whether a
professional, such as a lawyer, could legally or ethically limit a client's
remedies by contract in the same way that a manufacturer could do with a
purchaser in a purely commercial setting."'7 Ultimately, the court concluded
that the principles underlying the ELR were insufficient to preclude an action
for professional malpractice. 3 '
Nothing contained in this act shall be interpreted to abolish, repeal, modify, restrict, or limit the
law now in effect in this state applicable to the professional relationship and liabilities between
the person furnishing the professional services and the person receiving such professional
service and to the standards for professional conduct.
See also FLA. STAT. § 471.023 (1998).





139 See id. Whether the ELR should bar legal malpractice actions has also been addressed in
Illinois, where the economic loss rule provides that negligence actions are strictly limited to cases involving
physical injury, property damage, or intentional fraud or misrepresentations. Contrary to Florida's decisions
in Resolution Trust and in Moransais, an Illinois court in Collins v. Reynard, barred legal
malpractice/negligence actions when only economic losses were sought. See Collins v. Reynard, 553 N.E.2d
69, 70 (ill. App. Ct. 1990). In Collins, a client alleged that her attorney negligently drafted, or approved,
a sales contract because (1) the contract did not reflect the client's intent to retain a first and prior security
interest in the business and assets sold; (2) her attorney advised her to sign the agreement without the
security interest; and (3) her attorney failed to advise her to obtain a signed financing statement from the
buyer. Id. As a result, when the buyer defaulted, the client found that she was an unsecured creditor, whose
interests were subordinate to those of a bank that took possession of the business and sold it to another
buyer. li at 70. The client's malpractice suit against her attorney was premised on both negligence and
breach of contract theories. id The district court concluded that the ELR barred negligence claims in legal
malpractice cases and based its decision on the fact that injuries resulting from legal malpractice were not
personal injuries, but were pecuniary injuries to intangible property interests. lId at 70 (citing Gruse v.
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Signaling a shift away from the broadening of the ELR's application, the
Moransais decision was not undisputed. Although the majority of the court
concurred with the opinion drafted by Justice Anstead, Senior Justice Overton
dissented.'39 In his dissenting opinion, Senior Justice Overton attempted to
reconcile the Moransais opinion with the court's prior reasoning in Casa
Clara Condominium Association, Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc. " In
Casa Clara, the court held that the consuming public as a whole should not
be forced to bear the cost of economic losses sustained by those failing to
bargain for adequate contract remedies. 4' Senior Justice Overton, concerned
with blurring the distinction between contract and tort causes of action,
Belline, 486 N.E.2d 398,404 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985); Yates v. Muir, 474 N.E.2d 934,937 (iIl. App. Ct. 1985)).
See also Manning, supra note 8, at 752. Since there must be a showing of harm that exceeded disappointed
economic expectations in order to recover damages in a negligence action, a legal malpractice claim based
in negligence could not stand. See Collins, 553 N.E.2d at 70. The district court reasoned that the exception
to the ELR for persons in the business of supplying information for the guidance of others in their business
transactions did not apply to lawyers, but applied instead to suppliers of information, such as surveyors,
newspapers, accountants, and credit bureaus. See Collins, 553 N.E.2d at 71 (citing Rozny v. Marnul, 250
N.E.2d 656, 662-63 (111. 1969). In support of this assertion, the court relied on case law and treatises that
originated long before the economic loss rule was introduced into Illinois common law.
The Illinois Supreme Court decision reversing the district court employed equally poor
reasoning. See Collins v. Reynard, 607 N.E. 2d 1185 (l. 1992). In its decision to allow legal malpractice
actions to be pled either as contract or tort claims, the court baldly disregarded what it perceives as the logic
of the district court's decision. See Harry F. Mooney, What's Happening in the Law: Surveying the New
Law Developments: Legal Malpractice. 60 DEF. CouNs. J. 367, 369-70 (1993); Manning, supra note 8.
In doing so, the court asserted that, "[lI]ogic may be a face card but custom is a trump." Collins, 607 N.E.2d
at 1186. The Illinois Supreme Court employed what could be called if-it-ain't-broke-don't-fix-it reasoning,
asserting that "[i]f something has been handled a certain way for a long period of time and if people are
familiar with the practice and accustomed to its use, it is reasonable to continue with that practice until and
unless good cause is shown to change the rule." Id. at 1186. Although the court was careful in limiting its
decision to legal malpractice actions, its reasoning completely disregarded emerging common law, such as
the ELR. If applied broadly, this opinion encourages courts to dismiss any common law precedent that is
difficult to apply and chills the evolution of novel legal analysis.
The Collins decision is salvaged only by a well-reasoned concurrence by Justice Miller who
defended the majority opinion, arguing that exempting legal malpractice actions from the ELR defense is
required by logic as well as custom. Id. at 1187. The keystone of Justice Miller's opinion was the notion
that the duty of competence traditionally imposed in the attorney-client relationship arises from the Rules
of Professional Conduct and exists without regard to the terms of any contract entered into by a lawyer and
her client. Id. at 1188-89.
139 See Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973,984 (Fla. 1999). Harding, C.J., Shaw and Pariente,
JJ. concurred with the opinion written by Anstead, J. Justices Wells and Pariente, however, asserted in a
separate concurring opinion that the ELR was improperly applied in AFM Corp. Senior Justice Overton
dissented in a separate opinion.
140 Casa Clara Condominium Ass'n, Inc. v. Charley Toppino & Sons, Inc., 620 So. 2d 1244 (Fla.
1993).
141 See id. at 1246-47 (quoting Sidney R. Barrett, Jr., Recovery of Economic Loss in Tort for
Construction Defects: A Critical Analysis, 40 S.C. L REv. 891,933 (1989)).
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lamented that the Moransais and Casa Clara decisions could not be
reconciled. Additionally, Senior Justice Overton expressed apprehension that
the majority opinion created too great a risk of liability for attorneys, and
feared that the opinion "mean[t] that if there is an express written contract for
legal services with a law firm then the aggrieved client may bring causes of
action upon the same facts on the basis of (1) a breach of contract and (2)
multiple tort claims for malpractice individually against each lawyer who had
anything to do with the case."'42 Senior Justice Overton warned that the
immediate effect of this boundless liability would be an increase in
malpractice insurance rates and ultimately an overall increase in the cost of
professional services imposed on all consumers. 43
The fact that Casa Clara involved a construction contract may have
contributed to Senior Justice Overton's dilemma. Although Moransais made
it clear that the ELR will not bar causes of action for negligent performance
of a professional service contract, although prohibiting claims for breach of
a contract for goods, Moransais does not provide guidance to courts faced
with hybrid contracts involving both goods and services. This is a situation
that typically arises in construction litigation, when, for example, a licensed
general contractor enters into a construction agreement to build a school.
Once the school is built, the walls begin to crumble but there is no injury to
any person or property.
Pursuant to the Florida Supreme Court's recent decisions in Moransais
and Comptech, the plaintiff may sue the contractor for negligence and any
building code violations that may have occurred. Additionally, the plaintiff
may be allowed to recover damages for the defective walls and any special
damages anticipated at the time of the contract under a standard breach of
contract for goods theory. In such an instance, the distinction between a
contract for services and a contract for goods is blurred, and it appears that
under Moransais the plaintiff will be permitted to recover damages in tort
even though warranty theory and breach of contract theory adequately
compensate the plaintiff for the cost of the crumbled walls.
This situation reflects two problems. First, the distinction between a
"service contract" and a "contract for goods" is not easily made in the arena
of construction litigation. The court has found that the ELR should not bar
negligence claims if the contract is strictly for services, such as legal services,
for which an outcome cannot be guaranteed. But, should the ELR bar claims
for professional malpractice if the service that is the subject of the contract is
the service of production of a good that can be quantified and warrantied?
142 Moransais, 744 So. 2d at 985 (Overton dissent).
143 See id.
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Second, the Florida Supreme Court's definition of a "profession" as "any
vocation requiring at a minimum a four-year college degree before licensing
is possible in Florida" is too broad.'" Alternatively, Black's Law Dictionary
defines a "professional" even more broadly as "a person who belongs to a
learned profession or whose occupation requires a high level of training and
proficiency."'45 Although the court in Monroe v. Sarasota County School
Board accepted the Florida Supreme Court's definition of professional, it
implied that the definition should be narrowed to include only those activities
for which a general standard of care is imposed upon members of that
profession."4  Specifically, the Monroe court interpreted Moransais as
applying "only to allow professionals to be sued personally on established
theories of professional negligence."' 47 As long as an ambiguity remains in
the definition of "professional," courts faced with professional malpractice
claims will have difficulty determining which instances require application of
the new standard for the economic loss rule.
The field of construction in particular presents some unique and troublesome
questions in the ELR debate. There are circumstances that support the
application of tort remedies for purely economic losses caused by professional
malpractice despite the fact that a building is a type of product.'48 In the field
of construction, contracts do exist, but often get lost in the hierarchy of
contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, architects and engineers, leaving the
intended owner of the building with inadequate remedies. 49 Therefore, courts
may ultimately conclude that there is sufficient justification for allowing
negligence claims for the limited purpose of resolving construction disputes,
despite the fact that the ELR prohibits such claims to be applied to contracts
for goods.
On the other hand, one could argue that regardless of the number of
parties involved in a construction litigation suit, once all cross claims and
counterclaims between and among the contractors, subcontractors, suppliers,
etc. have been resolved, the purchaser of the building will still be made whole
again through contractual remedies including any special damages. In such
" Moransais, 744 So. 2d at 976 (citing Garden v. Frier, 602 So. 2d 1273, 1275 (Fla. 1992)).
145 BLACK'S LAW DIMrONARY 1226 (7th ed. 1990).
14 See Monroe v. Sarasota Sch. Bd., 746 So. 2d 530,533 (Fla. 2d DCA 1999) ("[B]y longstanding
precedent, the relationship created when those teachers/administrators assisted Mr. Monroe in the
application process does not support the imposition of a general standard of care upon these teachers to
protect his economic interests in future potential employment with the School Board. The risk that he
might sustain these intangible economic damages is not a type of risk from which the licensed teachers were
required, as a matter of traditional common law, to protect Mr. Monroe.").
147 Id. at 534.
"' See id. at 538.
149 See id.
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an instance, allowing tort claims against the "professionals" involved is
superfluous.
V. THE ELR, PROFESSIONAL STANDARDS, AND STATUTORY REMEDIES
FOR PROFESSIONAL MALPRACTICE
Like other professional service contracts, most attorney-client contracts
do not contain specific provisions dealing with the manner in which the
lawyer will perform the services.'" In an attorney-client relationship, unlike
most contractual relationships, services are not bargained for, results are not
warranted or promised, and, although the client agrees to pay fees, the
attorney agrees to do nothing more than be employed."' Thus, in an attorney-
client relationship and in the context of other professional relationships, it is
necessary to imply a promise creating an implied contract with provisions that
the services will be performed in accordance with professional standards. 2
Generally, an attorney who commits malpractice is liable in tort regardless of
a contractual relationship, even though only economic losses are suffered." 3
A special relationship exists between the attorney and the client that imposes
upon the attorney a duty to protect the client from being deprived of economic
expectations through the attorney's negligence."
Likewise, an attorney's obligation to his client is not based solely on the
contract existing between them. 5 5 The attorney's fiduciary duty provides the
foundation of the attorney-client relationship.5 6  At least one court has
explicitly recognized that this relationship arises outside of the contract
between the attorney and client. 7 Rather, the lawyer's duties to his client
originate from the ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct and the ABA
Model Code of Professional Responsibility. The Rules of Professional
Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility provide that it is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in acts involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation." 8 These Rules govern attorney behavior
150 See Powers & Niver, supra note 98, at 494.
13, See Manning, supra note 8, at 754.
152 See Powers & Niver, supra note 98, at 494.
153 See Schwiep, supra note 5, at 40.
15, See Manning, supra note 8, at 754.
155 See id. at 753.
'% See Dodrill, supra note 5 1, at 1212. See also MODELRULESOFPROFESSIONALCONDUCr Rules
1.6 and cmt., Rule 1.7 and cmt. - 1.9 and cmt. (1991); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
Canon 4 and EC 4-1 - 4-6 and DR 4-101, Canon 5 and EC 5-1 - 5-24 and DR 5-101 - 5-107 (1983).
I5 See 2314 Lincoln Park West Condominium Ass'n v. Mann, Gin, Ebel & Frazier, Ltd., 555
N.E.2d 346, 353 (Ii. 1990). See also Dodrill, supra note 51, at 1212.
'38 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 8.4(c); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
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even if an attorney-client relationship has not been created by contract or
otherwise.
The rationale for deferring to the Rules of Professional Conduct when
dealing with legal malpractice actions parallels arguments made in considering
whether the ELR should apply to statutory claims. In Rubio v. State Farm
Fire & Casualty Co., Florida's Third District Court of Appeal rejected the
idea that the economic loss rule swallows up statutory causes of action." 9
Subsequently, in Delgado v. J.W. Courtesy Pontiac GMC-Truck, Inc.,
Florida's Second District Court of Appeal concluded that the ELR had not
eliminated a statutory cause of action under the Florida Deceptive and Unfair
Trade Practices Act (FDUTPA) involving a consumer transaction based on a
written sales contract."W This sentiment was echoed by Florida's First District
Court of Appeal one month later in Sarkis v. Pafford Oil Co., Inc..6 1 The
court warned that when determining whether to apply the ELR to statutory
causes of action, courts should consider the possibility that, in some cases,
precluding the action could amount to judicial interference with authority
vested in the legislature.' 62 Although acknowledging that some Florida courts
held that the economic loss rule could be applied to statutory actions, the
Sarkis court asserted that such application should be limited to statutory tort
claims. 6
3
Florida's Third District Court of Appeal struggled, in Comptech
International, Inc. v. Milam Commerce Park, Ltd.,'" with the question of
whether the ELR should apply to a cause of action for economic damages
brought under the South Florida Building Code. 165  Although the Second,
Fourth and Fifth District Courts of Appeal agreed that statutory causes of
REPONSIBILITY DR-102(A)(4). In Florida, a legal malpractice action has three elements: (1) the attorney's
employment; (2) the attorney's neglect of a reasonable duty; and (3) proof that the neglect of a reasonable
duty is the proximate cause of loss to the client. See Dadic v. Schneider, 722 So. 2d 921 (Ha. 4th DCA
1998); Lenahan v. Russell L Forkey, P.A., 702 So. 2d 610 (Ha. 4th DCA 1997); Resolution Trust Corp.
v. Holland & Knight, 832 F. Supp. 1528 (S.D. Fla. 1993).
159 See Rubio v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 662 So. 2d 956 (Fla. 3d DCA 1995).
'o See Delgado v. J.W. Courtesy Pontiac GMC-Truck, Inc., 693 So. 2d 602,609 (Ha. 2d DCA
1997). The Delgado court was primarily concerned about undermining the power of the legislature.
16 Sarkis v. Pafford Oil Co., Inc., 697 So. 2d 524, 527 (Fla. 1st DCA 1997).
162 See id. at 527.
163 See id.
I6 Comptech Int'l, Inc. v. Milam Commerce Park, Ltd., 711 So. 2d 1255 (Ha. 3d DCA 1998)
(Before Cope, Gersten, and Shevin, JJ. Majority opinion by Gersten, J. Dissenting opinion by Cope, J.).
165 See id. at 1257 (concluding that the ELR did not permit a cause of action for economic damages
brought under the South Florida Building Code where the claims were clearly contractual in nature and the
cause of action was inseparably connected to the breaching party's performance under the agreement).
But see id. at 1258 (emphasizing that the ELR did not exclude separate and independent building code
violation claims, or claims arising from noncontractual settings).
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action were not limited by the economic loss rule, the Comptech court decided
differently. The court reasoned that where the parties to an agreement
negotiated within a contractual setting the same duties as occasioned by a
statute, a breach of which would lead to the same economic losses involving
identical elements to the claim, the economic loss doctrine would prevail." 6
Thus, the ELR applied if the cause of action founded on the statutory tort was
dependent upon the contract. 67 Simply because the cause of action arises out
of a statute does not make it an "independent" obligation.'68 Instead, the
independence comes from the fact that the claims cannot be asserted in a
breach of contract claim. 69
In his dissenting opinion, Judge Cope asked whether the ELR, as applied
by the majority, abolished the statutory cause of action for a violation of the
building code. 70 Judge Cope asserted that contractual remedies should not
replace statutory causes of action. Rather, the contract should supplement the
statute, allowing wronged parties to recover damages under both the contract
and the statute. Judge Cope specifically referred to language in the disputed
statute in Comptech, which provided that "[n]otwithstanding any other
remedies available, any... party... damaged as a result of a violation ... has
a cause of action.., against the... party who committed the violation. 17'
Judge Cope interpreted the phrase "notwithstanding any other remedies" to
mean "notwithstanding any other remedies-including a contract remedy."
172
This language plainly dictated that a litigant can sue under the statute in
addition to demanding any other remedies that may be available to the
litigant.' 3s The fact that the plaintiff also had a contract claim was
irrelevant. 74 Judge Cope admonished the majority opinion as having the
practical effect of eliminating statutory causes of action entirely.
75
Judge Cope further asserted that the ELR should not apply to statutory
causes of action at all.' 76 He reasoned that the economic loss rule was simply
a judge-made rule designed to sort out whether a plaintiff may make a
common-law contract claim or common-law tort claim. 77 Since common-law
'6 See id. at 1257.
16 See id.
l6 See id. at 1257 n.2.
I" See id.
170 See id. at 1266 (dissenting opinion).








FLORIDA'S ECONOMIC LOSS RULE
contract claims and common-law tort claims are themselves judge-made
causes of action, it was permissible for the judiciary to adopt the ELR as a
judge-made rule for deciding whether claims can be brought in contract or in
tort.'78 However, it was not permissible forjudge-made rules to encroach upon
rules made by the legislature.'79
In its first opinion citing Moransais, the Florida Supreme Court agreed
with Judge Cope's analysis and quashed the Third District's decision in
Comptech.' " Holding that the ELR could not be used to eliminate a statutory
cause of action, the court stated:
It is undisputed that the Legislature has the authority to enact laws
creating causes of action. If the courts limit or abrogate such
legislative enactments through judicial policies, separation of powers
issues are created, and that tension must be resolved in favor of the
Legislature's right to act in this area.'
Although the court acknowledged that the ELR has "some genuine, albeit
limited, value in tort and contract law," the court held that it cannot be used
as a barrier to legitimate causes of action, regardless of whether those are
statutory or common law causes of action.
8 2
Additionally, when deciding whether the ELR may be applied to legal
malpractice actions, courts must consider the positions of the parties at the
time contracts for legal services are negotiated. In East River, the Supreme
Court concluded that "since a commercial situation does not involve large
disparities in bargaining power, [there is] no reason to intrude into the parties'
allocation of the risk."'8 3 This may be true if sophisticated parties are
negotiating for the sale of goods; however, if negotiating a contract for legal
services the asymmetry of powers is obvious. In most cases, consumers of
professional services are not sophisticated parties and are unaware of potential
liabilities. Generally, the attorney will have a superior knowledge of contract
negotiations and liabilities for potential negligence or malpractice. The client,
'17 See id.
17 See id. Subsequently, Florida's Fifth District Court of Appeal adopted Judge Cope's analysis
in Stallings v. Kennedy Elec., Inc., 710 So. 2d 195 (Fla. 5th DCA 1998). The Stallings court held that "the
economic loss rule does not apply to statutory causes of action and should not be used as a sword to defeat
them." Id. at 197. See also Comptech Int'l, Inc. v. Milam Commerce Park, Ltd., Nos. 93-336 and 93-126,
1999 WL 983857 (Fla. Oct. 28, 1999).
1 See Comptech Int'l, Inc., 1999 WL 983857.
IN Id. at *2.
182 See id. at *7.
1 East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, Inc., 476 U.S. 858, 873 (1986) (citing
Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960)).
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who is often not a lawyer, has an information deficiency. Most clients do not
know to, or are unable to, negotiate for tort liability. In such circumstances,
it is unreasonable to expect average consumers of professional services to be
adequately protected by contractual remedies.
The present debate regarding the applicability of the ELR to professional
malpractice actions is based on the presumption that the contract is the only
instrument governing the parties' relationship. Even while criticizing courts
for blindly applying the ELR to any circumstance in which there is a
contractual relationship, no matter how tenuous the relationship or how great
the wrong committed, lawyers and academics fail to consider the
extracontractual body of supporting law. There is rarely any concern
regarding standard forms, contracts of adhesion, parol evidence, or other
means of defining the relationship between the parties outside of their
contractual relationship. The Interstate Securities court has been criticized for
assuming that breach of fiduciary duty claims against a securities broker are
per se barred by the ELR simply because the customer signed a standard
account agreement.' 8 ' In fact, the ELR as applied in Interstate Securities,
would extinguish all business torts since, in most commercial tort cases, the
litigants are involved in some type of contractual relationship, and the
damages sought are generally economic in nature." 5 The Interstate Securities
decision is contrary to long-standing case law holding that stockbrokers owe
customers a fiduciary duty of good faith, loyalty and fair dealing above that
required from other contractors. 8" Similarly, courts have traditionally held
attorneys to a higher duty of care than other contractors.
For example, in attorney-client relationships, the Rules of Professional
Conduct present just one means of defining the extracontractual relationship
between an attorney and client. The Rules of Professional Conduct serve as
a foundation for the contractual relationship created at the time that a retainer
agreement is executed. Clearly, an attorney cannot negotiate to opt out of the
Rules. Even if the Rules are not explicitly integrated into the contract
between an attorney and her client, these Rules contain the default liability
provisions for parties entering into an attorney-client relationship.
Furthermore, the purpose of the ELR, in limiting extracontractual
remedies, is to isolate the contractual relationship from its extracontractual
context. When limiting plaintiffs to contractual remedies, the court does not
consider the parties' relative situations at the time they entered into the
contract, unequal bargaining power, knowledge deficiencies, past conduct of
the parties, implied contractual obligations, or well-established duties of good
1 See Hanzman, supra note 36, at 43.
19 See id. at 44.
186 See id.
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faith and fair dealing. It is neither typical nor wise to view any contract
without regard to the circumstances surrounding its origination.
VI. CONCLUSION
Prior and subsequent to the Moransais decision there has been much
discussion among attorneys, judges, and academics regarding the proper
parameters of the economic loss rule. Many warn against the mechanical
extension of the ELR to professional and fiduciary relationships, such as the
attorney-client relationship. 1 7 Some propose that intentional tort claims for
economic losses should survive the ELR .defenses.88 The Florida Supreme
Court appears to agree and has asserted that the ELR should not apply to any
contract for professional services. 9
Despite extremely restricting the ELR's application, Moransais and
Comptech are correct in refusing to allow the ELR to bar professional mal-
practice and statutory causes of action. Given the present use of the economic
loss rule, the rule simply is not applicable to professional malpractice actions.
First, the ELR does not bar actions that arise independently of a contractual
relationship. To the extent that most professionals must comply with the
standards set forth for other professionals in their community, these duties are
extracontractual and therefore cannot be barred by the economic loss rule.
Secondly, the ELR is based upon the presumption that parties to a contract
have pre-negotiated liability in the event of a breach. In most professional
service relationships, and especially in an attorney-client relationship, the
information disparities between the parties make it impossible to negotiate
such terms. Therefore, the economic loss rule cannot force the parties to rely
on liability provisions negotiated at the time of the contract.
Finally, although it appears that the ELR accomplishes the function of
reducing claims brought before the court, a common law doctrine that simply
eliminates legitimate statutory and common law causes of action all together
is not a suitable means for achieving this goal. It is impermissible to allow
courts to simply eliminate causes of action, and thereby encroaches on the
Legislature's power to set forth causes of action and duties between members
of the community. Arbitration mechanisms and summary judgment
procedures are far better suited to the purpose of reducing docket congestion.
Once the standard for any given cause of action, such as professional
malpractice, is well defined, it is far easier for the courts to make informed
determinations of whether there is a legitimate claim that should be redressed.
19 See Esquibel, supra note 11, at 852.
In See Schwiep, supra note 5, at 40.
289 See Moransais v. Heathman, 744 So. 2d 973, 983-84 (Fla. 1999).
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It is very likely the Moransais and Comptech decisions will soon be
interpreted as striking down the ELR defenses to statutory causes of action
such as RICO and civil theft. However, it remains to be seen whether the
Comptech court's statement that the ELR cannot bar legitimate common law
causes of action will serve the court's stated purpose of returning the ELR to
the arena of products liability, or whether it will defeat the economic loss rule
entirely.
